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Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
INTRODUCTION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 19671
(ADEA) was enacted "to promote employment of older per-
sons based on their ability ... [and] to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment."2 Modeled after title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 the ADEA prohibits employers from
using age as a factor 4 in employment decisions or from classify-
ing employees in ways that would adversely affect employment
opportunities because of age.5 The ADEA, however, does ex-
empt such actions if based on business necessity or reasonable
factors other than age.6
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
2. Congress also included among the stated purposes of the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967's (ADEA) "to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment."
Id. § 621(b). The protected category originally included workers between 40
and 65 but the upper limit was raised to 70 in 1978. Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982)).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). For a discussion about the relationship of
the two statutes, see infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
4. As is true in title VII cases, there is not total consensus about the de-
gree of causality required in multimotive age discrimination cases. The Sixth
Circuit requires that age have "made a difference in determining whether the
[plaintiff] was to be retained or discharged," Laugeson v. Anaconda, 510 F.2d
307 (6th Cir. 1975), while the First Circuit requires that "but for age, the plain-
tiff would have gotten the job," Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.
1979). In refining these standards, other circuits require only that age be "a"
determining factor. See Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1111-12
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640
F.2d 974, 984 (9th Cir. 1981); Bentley v. Stromberg-Carlsson Corp., 638 F.2d 9, 11-
12 (2d Cir. 1981); Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 896-98 (3d. Cir. 1980);
Clerverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 641 (8th Cir. 1979).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982). The ADEA also prohibits labor unions and
employment agencies from the same sort of actions in regard to their members
or clients. Id. § 623(b),(c).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1982). Like title VII, the ADEA specifically sanc-
tions differentiation based on the protected class in certain situations. The
ADEA statutorily excludes settings where
age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business; the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age; the age criterion is needed
to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or employee bene-
fit plan; and the individual is discharged or disciplined for good cause.
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Because title VII and the ADEA are nearly identical in
wording and purpose, courts often look to title VII cases for
guidance in interpreting and applying the ADEA.7 In Geller v.
Markham,8 the Second Circuit applied title VII disparate im-
pact analysis to an ADEA claim, a holding that has been criti-
cized by a number of commentators. 9 The Eighth Circuit's
Id. § 623(f). In the second and fourth of these exceptions, the differentiation is
not based on age. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text. The courts also
have developed a judicial exemption under disparate impact analysis which
may be extended to the ADEA. This is the "business necessity" or "job-relat-
edness" test developed in title VII cases. See infra notes 25-29, 120-37, and ac-
companying text.
7. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979) ("the ADEA
and title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the
workplace"); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) ('There are important simi-
larities between [the ADEA and title VII] ... both in their aims-the elimina-
tion of discrimination from the workplace-and in their substantive
prohibitions.").
8. Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
945 (1981).
9. Some commentators argue that the ADEA should be interpreted
wholly apart from title VII principles. See Cleveland, Problems in Age Discrimi-
nation, Paoc. N.Y.U. 33D ANN. NAT'L CoNF. LAB. 351, 365 (1981) (age discrimina-
tion is different from title VII discriminations and hence cannot be treated
under title VII legal principles.); Liddle, Disparate Treatment Claims Under the
ADEA: The Negative Impact of McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 5 EMPL. REL. L.J.
549, 558 (1979) (courts should develop a distinctive body of ADEA law and not
simply rely on title VII precedent); Schuck, Age Discrimination Revisited, 57
Cmc.-KErN L. REV. 1029 (1981) (because age discrimination brings benefits and
is not invidious, it is different from racial discrimination); Note, The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HAv. I. REV. 380, 410-11 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Harvard Note] (even though the substantive and proce-
dural provisions of title VII and the ADEA are nearly identical, the distinctions
between age, race, and sex discrimination justify different standards of proof
and liability). Others concentrate on denying only the extension of disparate
impact analysis from title VII to the ADEA. Geller, 451 U.S. at 945-49 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA:
Intent or Impac in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AcT: A COMPLIANCE
AND LITIATION MANUAL 68, 68-115 (1981) (disparate impact analysis should not
be used in ADEA lititgation even though the ADEA is copied from title VII);
Schneiderman, The Law of Age Discrimination: Disparate Treatment and Dis-
parate Impac4 in AGE DISCRUMmATION 181 (1982); Note, Age Discrimination
and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REv. 837, 838 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Stanford Note] (disparate impact analysis is not appropriate for age
discrimination cases because age discrimination is not a perpetuation of past
discrimination).
On the other hand, there is substantial precedent and commentary sup-
porting the use of title VII precedents in ADEA disparate treatment cases. See
supra note 7 and infra note 72. Although no journal articles advocate the use
of disparate impact analysis in ADEA lititgation, several articles note that the
parallelism of the ADEA and title VII would make it a logical extension. See
Blackburn, Charting Compliance Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act 57 Cm.-KENT I REv. 559, 578-82 (1981) (ADEA and title VII procedures and
prohibitions are generally parallel and title VII precedents are applicable to
ADEA); Williams, Proving an Age Discrimination Employment Act Case, in
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recent approval of disparate impact analysis under the ADEA
in Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College o will accentuate that
dispute.
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the use of
disparate impact analysis in ADEA cases.ml As a specialist in
employment discrimination law recently wrote, "the most sig-
nificant ADEA issue of the next decade is the application of ti-
tle VII 'disparate impact' precedents to the ADEA."12 That
issue, however, is not confined to the question of whether dis-
parate impact theory is appropriate in ADEA litigation.
Equally important is the need to develop a standard for statisti-
cal analysis under disparate impact theory and a clear under-
standing of the available defenses.
This Note examines the use of disparate impact analysis in
age discrimination cases arising under the ADEA. Part I re-
views the development of title VII disparate impact theory and
the parties' burdens of proof. Part H discusses the Geller and
Leftwich decisions and the rationale for applying disparate im-
pact analysis in ADEA cases. That part concludes that the lan-
guage of the ADEA, its legislative history, its similarities with
title VII, and the policy considerations underpinning the theory
support the use of disparate impact analysis in ADEA cases.
Finally, Part HI analyzes standards for the prima facie dispa-
rate impact case and its rebuttal. This Note concludes that to
maintain the integrity of disparate impact analysis, statistical
theory must be kept distinct from policy decisions about legal
requirements. In addition, to follow the congressional mandate
to eliminate age discrimination in the work place, courts must
narrowly construe the statutory and judicial exemptions.
AGE DISCRIMINATION 147, 166 (1982) (the EEOC believes that disparate impact
theory is applicable in ADEA cases). More importantly, several courts have
implicitly used disparate impact analysis for the ADEA. See Polstorif v.
Fletcher, 452 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Ala. 1978); Coates v. National Cash Register Co.,
433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977). Two circuit courts have done so explicitly.
See Geller, 635 F.2d at 1032 (2d Cir. 1980); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Col-
lege, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983).
10. 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
11. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Geller, Justice Rehn-
quist dissented from that denial, stating- 'This Court has never held that proof
of discriminatory impact can establish a violation of the ADEA" and also as-
serting that cost should be considered a "reasonable factor other than age." 451
U.S. at 947-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting to denial of cert.). Rehnquist clearly
wanted to review Geller in order to overturn it.
12. Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 184-86 (arguing against an extension of
disparate impact).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISPARATE IMPACT
ANALYSIS
In Griggs v. Duke Power Company,13 the United States
Supreme Court held that a title VII plaintiff could make a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a facially
neutral employment policy or practice adversely affected a pro-
tected group.14 Prior to Griggs, when courts used only dispa-
rate treatment analysis, a title VII plaintiff had to prove that the
employer intentionally treated the employee differently from
others because of the employee's protected status.15 By con-
13. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14. "[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is busi-
ness necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."
Id. at 431.
15. The basis of disparate treatment analysis is that everyone can and
should be treated equally. This approach, however, contains both mechanical
and theoretical difficulties. For a discussion of the theoretical problems, see in-
fra note 93. In order to prove discrimination-that similarly situated people
are treated differently-a plaintiff has to prove that the employer intended to
discriminate against the plaintiff or the plaintiff's minority group. Since it is
illegal to discriminate, and costly if one is caught, in only the most blatant of
circumstances will the plaintiff be able to garner the requisite evidence. Even
when there is evidence to garner, it is time consuming and costly because of
the extensive discovery usually needed to feret out proof of subjective intent.
Equally important, discrimination is not always intentional at a conscious level.
Under such circumstances it is unfair and counterproductive to require proof of
a motive that is unnecessary for the action and the harm.
The development of disparate impact as an alternative theory has relieved
some of the inequities resulting from the above difficulties by extending the
definition of discrimination. Additionally, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), does the same thing for disparate treatment by extending
the type of evidence that can be used to infer subjective intent to include sta-
tistical indications of different treatment. McDonnell Douglas also details the
four elements needed to create that inference of intentional discrimination
under disparate treatment: the plaintiff must establish that he or she (1) be-
longed to a racial minority; (2) applied and was qualified for the job; (3) was
rejected; and (4) the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants with plaintiff's qualifications. Id. at 802.
McDonnell Douglas also provides a model for burden and allocation of
proof in employment discrimination cases under disparate treatment. Once a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, it is up to the defendant to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's discharge. If this is done, plaintiff
may still prevail by proving the defendant's reason was merely pretextual. Id.
at 802-04.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), reinter-
preted this standard to mean that "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id. at 253. But in seeking to clarify how
this was to be applied, the Court succeeded only in muddying the waters. See
id. at 253-56.
The significant problems that this confusion creates for disparate treatment
10411984]
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centrating on result rather than motive, disparate impact analy-
sis encompasses a wider view of employment discrimination
that requires no showing of scienter.16 A policy's differential
effect is judicially seen to fall within the statutory definition of
discrimination.17
Although the initial disparate impact cases clearly indi-
cated that statistical disparity rather than intent can establish a
prima facie case of discrimination,18 none presented a clear
standard as to what constitutes "significant disparity" between
the employee group and the comparative group.19 Nor did
analysis will not be discussed here. The Court specifically distinguished dispa-
rate treatment from disparate impact analysis and noted that its holding did
not apply to cases analyzed under the latter. Id. at 252 n.5.
16. [Glood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-
in headwinds" for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More
than that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing
that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
17. The Court has consistently interpreted title VII as an intent by Con-
gress to end discrimination both in the form of intentional actions and in the
form of differential effect. In so doing, of course, the Court has broadened the
definition of discrimination to include not only an act or practice based on dis-
criminatory motive but also a consequence of a neutral act or policy that im-
pacts categorically. It can be inferred that Congress agrees with this
interpretation because it has made no attempt to alter title VII to preclude that
view even though it has amended the statute since Griggs was announced in
1972.
18. In Griggs, for example, the defendant employer required a high school
diploma and a passing score on a general intelligence test if the applicant were
to work anywhere besides the low paying, predominantly black manual labor
department. There was, however, no relation between the skills supposedly
measured by the requirements and the skills needed to satisfactorily perform
jobs in the nonlabor departments. Most importantly, the effect of those re-
quirements was to disqualify a substantially larger percentage of blacks than
white. Although the Court hypothesized that past educational discrimination
against blacks contributed to the differential impact of the employer's tests, it
did not find the reason for the adverse effect central to its holding of discrimi-
nation. 401 U.S. at 430-31.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), applied the disparate impact
analysis used in Griggs and its progeny to, sex discrimination. In Dothard, the
plaintiff charged that physical requirements (minimum of 5'2", 120 pounds) for
a job in the correctional system constituted illegal sex discrimination because
over 41% of all women were excluded while less than 1% of all men were ex-
cluded. The Court agreed that the facially neutral height and weight require-
ments did adversely affect women. It then held that because they were
unnecessary for the job, they were illegal discrimination. Id. at 329-32.
19. Without explicitly discussing a statistical standard for determining ad-
verse impact, Griggs based its finding of discrimination on the "dis-
qualifi[cation of] Negroes at substantially higher rate[s] than white
applicants." 401 U.S. at 426. Dothard also failed to establish a specific standard,
[Vol. 68:10381042
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these cases explain what group should be used as the compara-
tive standard against which to measure the employer's work
force.20 Moreover, because the courts have set these standards
on a case-by-case basis, neither plaintiff nor defendant knows
what statistical evidence establishes a prima facie case.
Whatever the standard used, once a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of illegal discrimination the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant.2 ' The defendant employer may try
either to discredit the plaintiff's evidence or show an applicable
exception for the employment practice. 22 In the former situa-
tion, the defendant may present contrary interpretations of the
plaintiff's statistical data or provide additional statistical data
casting doubt on the original inference of illegal discrimina-
indicating only that the facts at bar (41% of all women vis-a-vis less than 1% of
all men were disqualified by the employment requirement) showed a great
enough disparity to prove discrimination. 433 U.S. at 329-31.
20. Both Griggs and Dothard looked to the qualified labor pool (potential
applicants) as the appropriate comparative standard, but only Dothard dis-
cussed why that benchmark was relevant to its facts. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at
426; Dothard, 433 U.S. at 328-31.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977), and Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), contin-
ued this discussion but did not provide a definite rule. Teamsters, however, un-
equivocally stated "[s]tatistics ... are probative ... [because] absent
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring prac-
tices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial
and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which em-
ployees are hired." 431 U.S. at 340 n.20. The Court also noted that, like other
evidence, statistical proof is rebuttable and should be viewed in the context of
the situation. Sample size and appropriateness of the benchmark are relevant
considerations. For example, while the general population was an appropriate
comparison point for jobs requiring no or easily learned skills, it would not be
probative where a job required specialized training. In those settings, the qual-
ified labor pool would be more relevant Id. at 339-40 & n.20.
Hazelwood reaffirmed Teamsters and emphasized the need to determine
the relevant, qualified labor market: "When special qualifications are required
to fill particular jobs, comparison to the general population (rather than to the
smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may
have little probative value." 433 U.S. at 308 n.13. Hazelwood also concluded
that the appropriate geographic scope of the relevant job market would depend
on the setting, but factors to be considered included the job skills required,
compensation level, the employer's recruitment practices, available public
transportation in the comminunity, and so on. Furthermore, statistical analysis
covering a period of time was preferable to a one-time snapshot of the situa-
tion. See id. at 304-13. In addition, Hazelwood seemed to endorse using a "two
or three standard deviation" differential as dispositive of the discrepancy being
caused by a factor other than chance (i.e., discrimination). Id. at 309 n.14.
21. "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Williams, supra note 9, at 161-63.
22. For a description of the exceptions, see supra note 6.
1984] 1043
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tion.23 This approach goes only to the quality of the plaintiff's
evidence. 24
When the plaintiffs evidence of disparate impact is uncon-
trovertible, the defendant may nonetheless avoid a finding of il-
legal discrimination if the employment practice is covered by
an exemption. In Griggs, the Supreme Court developed the ex-
emption of "job-relatedness" or "business necessity."2 5 The
Court defined this exemption more precisely in Albemarle Pa-
per Company v. Moody:26 a prima facie case of illegal discrimi-
nation can be rebutted by proving the practice in question is
job related in that it directly measures a skill needed for the
job.27 Even if the defendant satisfies this burden, however, the
plaintiff could still prevail by showing an alternative practice
that the employer could use to achieve the desired end without
the illegal differential impact.28
23. For example, the employer could show that little or no hiring or promo-
tion occurred since the legislation was passed and the current disparate impact
was thus a result of preAct practice that circumstances have not allowed the
employer to remedy. Depending on the data presented by the plaintiff, the em-
ployer could also argue that the plaintiffs statistical standard or comparative
benchmark were inappropriate. See W. CONNOLLY & J. PETERSON, USE OF STA-
TISTICS IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTuNrrY LITIGATION §§ 3.01-3.06 (1983); Mc-
Morrow, The Prima Facie EEO Case and Its Rebuttal 30 LAB. L.J. 20, 24 (1979).
24. For example, in Dothard, the defendant employer challenged the plain-
tiff's use of national averages for the weight and height of women as an im-
proper comparison and argued that disparate impact could be shown only if the
percentage of women hired was disproportionate to those actually applying.
The Court refused to accept the defendant's view for two reasons. First, it
noted that using the actual applicant pool would disregard the fact that the
publicized height and weight requirements may have prevented many other-
wise qualified applicants from applying. Second, since the defendant did not
show otherwise, it was reasonable to assume the physical characteristics of
Alabamians mirrored the national population. 433 U.S. at 329-31.
25. An employment test or requirement which has an adverse effect on a
protected group will be excused only when that procedure directly and reason-
ably measures the ability of the candidate to do the job. No matter how useful
or accurate a predictor the test is, it cannot be used if it adversely affects a pro-
tected classification when there is any other alternative. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at
431-36 ("The touchstone is business necessity."); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331-32; see
generally Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Ade-
quate Standards, 15 GA. L. REv. 376 (1981) (narrowly construed and strictly en-
forced business necessity test will enhance effectiveness of title VII).
Griggs found that an employment practice was prohibited if it had an ad-
verse effect on black applicants and was not shown to be related to job per-
formance. 401 U.S. at 431. Similarly, Dothard held that height and weight
requirements could not be used as a proxy measure for strength if strength was
the real job requirement. In the latter case, strength must be measured di-
rectly. 433 U.S. at 331-32.
26. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
27. Id. at 425-36.
28. Id. at 425; Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
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II. APPLYING DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS
TO THE ADEA
A. THE CASES: GELLER V. MARKHAM AND LEFTWICH V. HARRIS-
STOWE STATE COLLEGE
To date, two federal circuit courts have held that a plaintiff
can use disparate impact theory in age discrimination cases
arising under the ADEA.29 Together, the analyses in Geller v.
Markham30 and Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College31 pro-
vide a model for determining the elements of a prima facie age
discrimination case and evaluating the defenses under dispa-
rate impact analysis.
In Geller, the employer school board followed its policy of
29. The Second and Eighth Circuits explicitly held that disparate impact
analysis applied in ADEA litigation. Three other circuits have alluded to the
use of disparate impact analysis in ADEA litigation but have gone no further.
A somewhat confused opinion by the Ninth Circuit in Kelly v. American Stan-
dard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981), may be seen to imply the use of disparate
impact analysis. However, a close reading of the case indicates that in deciding
the appropriateness of punitive damages, which can only be awarded under the
ADEA for "willful violations", the court was searching for a definition of "will-
ful violation." In discussing the plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie
case, Kelly noted that it could be established via the McDonnell Douglas stan-
dard without showing a state of mind. 640 F.2d at 980. However, McDonnell
Douglas is a disparate treatment case. In citing the McDonnell Douglas stan-
dard, Kelly seems to say that an inference of intentional discrimination can be
drawn without inferring bad motive. The court then cited Geller in a footnote
as showing statistical evidence alone can establish discriminatory impact. Id.
at 980 n.9. Because the court did not really examine disparate impact analysis
or its use in any case other than Geller and because its emphasis was on "Will-
ful violation" and the appropriate remedy, this case should not be relied on to
show the Ninth Circuit holds disparate impact analysis applies in ADEA litiga-
tion.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Allison v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 680 F.2d
1318 (11th Cir. 1982), used disparate impact analysis in reviewing an appeal urg-
ing error in jury instructions but did not decide if disparate impact analysis is
appropriately applied in ADEA cases. Allison noted that even if disparate im-
pact analysis applied, the jury apparently believed that the defendant's statisti-
cal expert effectively rebutted the plaintiff's showing under either disparate
treatment analysis or disparate impact analysis. Although the lower court's in-
structions to the jury did not distinguish the two theories, they were generally
correct and no harmful error was committed. Allison specifically reserved
judgment on the issue of using disparate impact analysis in ADEA litigation.
Id. at 1323.
The Third Circuit, in Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d
Cir. 1983), also used the analysis without deciding whether it applied to ADEA
cases. In Massarsky, the Third Circuit held that even if disparate impact analy-
sis were used, the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case because his
evidence was only that General Motor's policy was detrimental to him. He pro-
vided no statistics showing that the policy had an adverse impact on the group
of employees between 40 and 70. Id. at 119-20.
30. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
31. 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
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hiring teachers below the sixth step of the salary scale and re-
placed a newly hired but experienced fifty-five year old teacher
with an inexperienced twenty-five year old.32 Geller, the fifty-
five year old, argued that because each step represented a year
of teaching experience and the goal of the policy was to save
money, the "Sixth Step Policy" made hiring teachers with more
than four years experience financially undesirable. She also of-
fered statistical evidence demonstrating a high correlation be-
tween age and experience: 92.6% of all teachers over forty had
five or more years of experience while only about 60% of those
under forty had five years or more. Citing several title VII dis-
parate impact cases, 33 the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff
could establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by
showing that the "Sixth Step Policy" had an adverse impact on
teachers over forty. The court then considered the statistical
evidence and found the correlation sufficient to hold the "Sixth
Step Policy" discriminatory as a matter of law.34
A similar age-experience-salary linked plan arose in
Leftwich. After the Missouri legislature transferred Harris-
Stowe College to the state college system, the Board of Regents
agreed to reduce the faculty by seventeen. The Regents classi-
fied the remaining positions as "tenured" and "nontenured"
and allowed those who held tenured slots before the reorgani-
zation to apply only for those tenured slots remaining.35 Three
biology teachers at the city college applied for positions at the
state college, but because of the reduction in faculty, the state
college had only one tenured and one nontenured biology posi-
tions. Watlington, a sixty-two year old black male who had
been tenured at the city college, obtained the tenured slot at
the state college. Werner, a thirty year old white male who had
not been tenured at the city college, got the nontenured slot at
the state college. The college terminated Leftwich, a white,
32. On September 3, 1976, plaintiff Geller was hired by the West Hartford
school system to fill an unexpected opening she began teaching on September
7. Two weeks later, she was terminated and replaced by a 25 year old teacher
who had not applied for the job until September 10. 635 F.2d at 1030.
33. 635 F.2d at 1032 (citing Griggs, Teamsters, and Hazelwood).
34. Id. at 1032-33.
35. In 1979, Harris-Stowe College was transferred from control of the St.
Louis Board of Education to a newly created Board of Regents under the state
college system. While the physical facilities, accreditation, curriculum and stu-
dent body remained virtually the same, the Regents reduced the number of
faculty positions from 51 to 34 in order to save money. A specified number of
tenured and nontenured faculty from the city college would be chosen to fill
designated "tenure" and "nontenure" positions in the state college. Leftwich,
702 F.2d at 689.
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forty-seven-year-old tenured professor who scored higher than
either Watlington or Werner on the evaluation test used to
make the selection decision.36 The Eighth Circuit noted that
Geller and Griggs provided appropriate precedent for estab-
lishing a prima facie case and held that, based on the statistical
data showing a "significant correlation" between age and ten-
ure status and age and salary, Leftwich had faced illegal
discrimination.37
In both Geller and Leftwich, the defendants first denied
that their policies resulted in discrimination. They argued that
although the policies might have a theoretical discriminatory
impact on those over forty, the real impact was not discrimina-
tory because, in Geller, the policy did not affect the percentage
of teachers over forty38 and, in Leftwich, the average age of the
faculty at the college remained "virtually the same."39 Both
courts dismissed this approach, although for different
reasons.4O
Alternatively, both defendants argued that even if the poli-
cies did have a discriminatory impact on the protected age
group, budget constraints made reducing costs a business ne-
36. 702 F.2d at 686, 689-90.
37. The mean age of the tenured faculty at the college before reorganiza-
tion was 45.8 while it was only 34.3 for the nontenured faculty. The mean an-
nual salary differential was equally substantial: $17,900 for tenured and $13,025
for nontenured. Id. at 690-91.
In addition to an ADEA challenge under disparate impact, Leftwich had
charged the college with a violation of the ADEA under disparate treatment
theory, a violation of title VII and a violation of the due process clause of the
14th amendment. The Eighth Circuit, however, explicitly refused to address
those charges and simply sustained the lower court's holding that Leftwich pre-
vailed in his ADEA disparate impact claim. Id. at 693 n.4.
Leftwich could show that he was qualified for both biology positions and
was a member of the protected group. When he was not allowed to apply for
the nontenured position, someone younger (and outside the protected group)
got the job. Thus he could also make a prima facie disparate treatment case
under the ADEA. See infra note 72.
38. 635 F.2d at 1033-34. The replacement of a 55 year old by a 25 year old is
unlikely to alter the proportion of teachers over 40 and under 40 more than a
minimal amount unless the group is relatively small. For example, in a group
of 100 teachers, the replacement of one 55 year old by one 25 year old would
reduce the average age by only .3 of a year. If the average age were 50, the al-
teration would reduce that average to only 49.7; if it were 40, the reduction
would be to 39.7.
39. 702 F.2d at 691.
40. Geller indicated that both the defendant's statistical expert and statis-
tics were unreliable. 635 F.2d at 1033-34. Leftwich noted that a "bottom line"
defense was not valid; the fact that other members of a protected class were
hired neither overcomes nor defends against a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under disparate impact. 702 F.2d at 691 (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440 (1982)).
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cessity and thus justified the policies. The Geller court, citing
Department of Labor interpretative guidelines4 1 and federal
court decisions,42 summarily rejected cost as a business excuse
for age discrimination in employment because the ADEA was
passed to prevent such discrimination.4 3 The Leftwich court,
while reaching the same conclusion, pursued a more extensive
analysis that resulted in a standard for shifting the burden of
persuasion as well as one for determining business necessity.
Looking to Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody44 for guidance,
the court noted that "[o] nce the plaintiff established his prima
facie case, the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendants
to prove that their selection plan was justified by business ne-
cessity."45 The Eighth Circuit pointed to congressional intent,
Department of Labor and Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) interpretative guidelines, 46 and federal
court decisions to support its holding that the need to save
41. The guidelines stated:
To classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for the pur-
pose of comparing costs, or for any other purpose, necessarily rests on
the assumption that the age factor alone may be used to justify a differ-
entiation-an assumption plainly contrary to the terms of the Act and
the purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based would
serve only to perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at which
the Act is directed.
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1979), quoted in Geller, 635 F.2d at 1034.
42. 635 F.2d at 1034.
43. Id. For a discussion of legislative intent in passing the ADEA, see in-
fra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
The court went on to discuss Gelier's disparate treatment claim as well.
Geller thus marks a midpoint on the road of disparate impact analysis exten-
sion. Previously, courts had not readily applied disparate impact in ADEA
cases; when both disparate impact and disparate treatment claims were avail-
able, courts pursued the latter. Here, Geller pursued both. Leftwich completes
the road because the Eighth Circuit applied only the disparate impact theory
even though Leftwich also had disparate treatment, title VII, and due process
claims. See supra note 37.
44. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
45. 702 F.2d at 691. Geller had talked in more general terms without noting
who had the burden of persuasion or proof. 635 F.2d at 1032.
46. The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor was originally
assigned the job of enforcing the ADEA. Its ADEA duties were shifted to the
EEOC, effective January 1, 1979, as a result of President Carter's reorganization
plan of 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 1987 (1978). One commentator has suggested that
Congress placed the ADEA under the Labor Department to begin with only be-
cause it was concerned that the EEOC caseload was too great to effectively
handle the potential ADEA litigation and because the secretary of labor had
the requisite resources to implement the sections requiring continuing studies
and information for public education about age. See Comment, Class Actions
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Question is "Why
Not?", 23 EMoRY L.J. 831, 838 (1974). At any rate, the shift of ADEA enforce-
ment to the EEOC adds weight to the belief that both Congress and the Execu-
tive view the ADEA and title VII as equivalent.
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costs cannot justify an adverse impact.47
In Leftwich, Harris-Stowe College also argued that the se-
lection plan was a business necessity because it promoted "in-
novation and quality among the faculty by giving the college
flexibility to hire non-tenured faculty."48 The court rejected
this argument on two grounds. First, the evidence showed that
the college had not suggested this purpose at the time of the
plan's inception and application. Second, even if the college
had adopted the plan for this purpose, the defendants failed to
carry their burden of showing that the plan was necessary to
achieve their goal. They showed neither a "manifest relation-
ship to the employment in question" nor "a compelling need
... to maintain that practice."49 The court acknowledged that
promoting innovation and quality among the faculty is a per-
missible goal,5 0 but concluded that the manner of achieving it
was neither necessary nor effective. By assuming that only
younger, nontenured faculty could create an exciting, quality
atmosphere, the college adhered to the "stereotypical thinking
about older workers that the ADEA was designed to elimi-
nate."5 ' Furthermore, the college retained Watlington and
Werner yet terminated Leftwich, who was clearly the most in-
novative, competent, and qualified of the three.5 2
B. RATIONALE FOR APPLICATION OF DISPARATE IMPACT
ANALYSIS TO ADEA CASES
Although the Second and Eighth Circuits noted the prece-
47. Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 691-92. For a discussion on the use of cost as a
reasonable factor other than age ("RFOA") or business necessity exclusion,
see infra notes 53, 57, 61, 62.
48. 702 F.2d at 692.
49. See id. (quoting Hawkins v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc., 697 F.2d 810 at 815
(8th Cir. 1983)).
50. The goal of an innovative and highly competent faculty is an allowable
goal in that it is not facially discriminatory.
51. 702 F.2d at 692. Leftwich did not hold that the reserving of nontenured
slots to create a specific atmosphere could not be shown to be a business ne-
cessity or a RFOA. Rather, the court emphasized that the college put forth this
excuse only as a defense in court and that its application of the policy actually
resulted in getting rid of the admittedly most creative and qualified person. Id.;
see also supra note 6 and accompanying text and infra notes 52-53.
52. 702 F.2d at 692. The court stated.
[T]he record in this case reveals that the defendant's plan may have
frustrated the development of new ideas within the college because it
succeeded in eliminating the plaintiff who was actively involved in re-
search and had published several articles, while retaining a nonten-
ured faculty member whose contribution.., was concededly less than
that of Leftwich.
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dential value of title VII litigation in interpreting the ADEA,
neither discussed the basis for applying disparate impact anal-
ysis to ADEA cases. The courts' silence on this aspect reflects
not an unsound footing for their position, but rather substantial
support for it. Indeed, the language of the statute, its legisla-
tive history, the courts' use of title VII precedent in interpret-
ing and applying the ADEA, and the policy considerations
underlying the Act support using disparate impact analysis for
age discrimination cases brought under the ADEA.
1. Statutory Language.
The ADEA, in identical wording to title VII,53 provides that
53. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) with 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). The
parallels extend even to amendments of title VII and the ADEA. In 1972,
changes were made in title VII so that it encompassed more employers with
fewer employees and extended coverage to federal and state agencies. Similar
amendments were made to the ADEA in 1974. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982).
The four exceptions to the word-for-word repetition of title VII in the
ADEA show that although Congress viewed age discrimination as part of the
discrimination that title VII was designed to prohibit, there were certain as-
pects of employment discrimination based on age that it viewed as distinguish-
able. Where Congress believed there was a difference, therefore, it specified
and provided for them.
First, although title VII prohibited discrimination based on the protected
category in apprenticeship or training programs, the ADEA made no such pro-
hibition. See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(d) (1976). Thus, although Congress viewed re-
training or additional training for older workers as an important tool in dealing
with unemployment, it did not intend to provide such training through the cur-
rent educational structure. A number of both practical and policy factors can
explain this distinction: most such programs are educationally oriented to
youth; in an area of great demand and few resources those with no training or
experience should have preference over those with some other kind of training
or experience; or retraining programs can be more efficiently organized if sepa-
rated from training programs that also teach basic education skills already pos-
sessed by retrainees.
Secondly, whereas title VII provided exemptions only for educational insti-
tutions, seniority or merit systems, and "bona fide occupational qualifications
reasonably necessary to the normal operations of the business," the ADEA ad-
ded to the latter "or where differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age." Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e),(h) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)
(1982). This additional exception, rather than negating the use of disparate im-
pact theory, shows that Congress actually intended the ADEA to cover facially
neutral policies that impacted adversely on older workers but exempt such pol-
icies when they were "reasonable" and "necessary for the normal operations of
business."
Thirdly, the ADEA deviated from title VII language in § 626 that outlines
the Act's recordkeeping, investigation, and enforcement procedures. Here Con-
gress explicitly indicated its deviation by noting that this section was based on
the Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 209, 211 (1982), and was to be
interpreted accordingly. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (1976) with 29
U.S.C. § 626 (1982).
Finally, the ADEA also includes a prohibition on reducing the wage of any
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"[ilt shall be unlawful for an employer.., to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's age."54 The phrase "adversely affect" im-
plies that an employment practice can constitute illegal dis-
crimination even if not intended or directed specifically at age.
Thus the phrase not only prohibits intentional age discrimina-
tion but also forbids any policy having a more harmful effect on
older people than on their co-workers.55
While "adversely affect" is the only phrase in title VII that
literally supports the concept of disparate impact, the ADEA
has additional statutory language to support this interpretation.
Section 623 of the ADEA states that discrimination will not be
considered illegal "where differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age" or when an individual is discharged or
disciplined for good cause.5 6 The inclusion of these exemptions
suggests that Congress thought an ADEA without exemptions
would prohibit all facially neutral policies with adverse effects
on older workers. Congress consequently carved out exemp-
tions to limit the statute's reach to unreasonable and unneces-
sary policies. For example, if a steel mill requires that workers
be able to lift sixty pounds over the course of an eight-hour day
in 100 degree heat, that policy might disqualify a larger percent-
age of sixty year old workers than twenty-five year old workers.
employee in order to comply with the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (3) (1982).
This fourth exception shows the congressional concern with the economic ef-
fects of age discrimination and supports the position taken by the EEOC, the
Department of Labor, and the courts, that cost cannot be considered a RFOA.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982) (emphasis added). Title VII has the same lan-
guage except that "race, color, sex or national origin" stand in the place of
"age." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) (1976).
55. As Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, said in Griggs,
'The Act [title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). He also noted that "Congress directed the thrust of
the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion." Id. at 432. Curiously, Blumrosen, who strongly supported the used of
disparate impact analysis in title VII racial discrimination cases, made only
passing reference to this language in title VII While noting that this language
was the statutory "anchor" for disparate impact, he merely added that "[i]t...
presents a technically new point of departure for purposes of statutory inter-
pretation. It suggests that a court's focus of attention should be more on the
consequences of actions than on the actor's state of mind." Blumrosen, Stran-
gers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination, 71 Mic. L REv. 59, 74 (1972).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1982). Neither of these exemptions is found in title
VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
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Nonetheless, the nature of that business requires the worker to
lift sixty pounds in that setting, so any disparate impact would
be excused. An accounting firm could not adopt this policy,
however, since nothing about an accountant's job requires such
physical endurance.57
In addition, the EEOC, the agency responsible for enforc-
ing the ADEA and title VI1,58 issued interpretative guidelines 59
that define how the EEOC will examine claims for the statu-
tory exemption of "reasonable factor other than age" (RFOA)
under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theo-
ries. 60 The EEOC would not have mentioned disparate impact
analysis unless it viewed such analysis as appropriate for
ADEA claims. Furthermore, both the EEOC and the Wage and
Hour Division guidelines note that cost is not a RFOA;61 an em-
ployer cannot refuse to hire older workers because they cost
more than younger workers. Thus these guidelines also sup-
port the use of disparate impact analysis in ADEA litigation be-
cause they outlaw cost, a facially neutral policy that adversely
affects older workers.
Both the prohibitory language and the statutory exemp-
tions support the use of disparate impact theory under the
ADEA. Any other interpretation would allow employers to
57. Senator Yarborough made clear that this interpretation was the con-
gressional intent. When asked for an example of an RFOA, Yarborough ex-
plained that speed or weight lifting ability might be a RFOA in certain settings.
See 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967). The subcommittee on labor, which met to ex-
amine oral and written statements about the proposed bill, also noted that
safety sometimes necessitated certain physical qualifications of applicants and
the the bill would not force the hiring of someone without such needed physical
qualifications simply because he or she was within the protected age group. 113
CONG. REC. 31,253 (1967). A summary of the subcommittee's findings is re-
printed in 113 CONG. REC. 31,250-253 (1967).
58. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4,-5 (1976).
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625. (1983).
60. Id. § 1625.7.
61. The EEOC provides: "A differentiation based on the average cost of
employing older employees as a group is unlawful except with respect to em-
ployee benefit plans [exempted by the Act]." Id. § 1625.7(f). The Wage and
Hour Division guidelines stated:
It should also be made clear that a general assertion that the average
cost of employing older workers as a group is higher than the average
cost of employing younger workers as a group will not be recognized
.... To classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for the
purpose of comparing costs, or for any other purpose, necessarily rests
on the assumption that the age factor alone may be used to justify a
differentiation-an assumption plainly contrary to the terms of the Act
and the purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based
would serve only to perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at
which the Act is directed.
Id. § 860.103.
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evade the statute by developing employment policies based on
a non-age criterion (such as experience or cost) that correlates
highly with age.62
2. Legislative History and Congressional Intent.
Earlier congressional attempts to outlaw age discrimina-
tion and the legislative history of the ADEA also support the
use of disparate impact theory in order to fulfill the congres-
sional intent. Senator Jacob Javits63 wanted to amend the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to include age among the protected catego-
ries but feared that his amendment, which had no assurance of
success, might jeopardize the chance of the bill's passage. 64 As
a compromise, Congress ordered the secretary of labor to study
the employment situation for older Americans and report to
Congress with relevant empirical data. 65 When the study re-
vealed the gloomy employment picture facing older Americans,
Congress passed the ADEA in hopes of improving the situation
by prohibiting age discrimination in employment decisions.
62. Two categories (or variables) can be so closely related that each acts
as a proxy for the other so that knowing the value of one enables you to predict
the value of the other. In statistical terminology, this relationship is called a
correlation; the higher the correlation, the greater the predictability. Thus, if
age and experience are highly correlated, an employer could avoid hiring older
people without directly using age as a factor by simply requiring that appli-
cants have little or no experience. For example, academic rank and age are
highly correlated in most postsecondary educational institutions. Because of
the years needed for academic training and professional credentialing, even the
youngest of tenured professors tend to be over 40. Thus an employer who of-
fered one year sabbaticals to its employees but required that the teacher be
nontenured would effectively exclude almost everyone over the age of 40.
While the employer may have a legitimate and compelling business reason for
favoring nontenured instructors, it should at least be required to come forth
with that reason since its policy has the effect of simultaneously favoring
younger employees over those in the protected age group.
63. Javits, Senator from New York, is a long time supporter of legislation
to end age discrimination. He played a major role in the passage of age dis-
crimination legislation in New York and has been introducing similar bills at
the national level since 1951 when he was a member of the House of Represent-
atives. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967).
64. One of the strategies of die-hard congressional segregationists in 1964
was to load up the bill with so many protected categories that it would accumu-
late additional special interest opponents and be voted down. In addition,
some members of Congress simply did not understand or believe in the magni-
tude of the age-discrimination problem in 1964. The combination of lack of sta-
tistical data to prove the existence of age discrimination and concern about the
whole Civil Rights Act killed the chance of winning support for an age discrimi-
nation prohibition in 1964. See id.
65. The Civil Rights Act directed the secretary of labor to study the .prob-
lem of age discrimination. The secretary's report, which was issued in July
1965, found that statutory prohibition would be necessary to deal with the prob-
lem. 113 CONG. REC. 31,250 (1967).
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Discussions in Congress when the ADEA was introduced,
as well as the language of the statute, show that Congress
clearly intended to extend title VII protection against discrimi-
nation to cover age.66 Senators Yarborough 67 and Javits, two of
the ADEA's most determined supporters, viewed ageism in
terms of general societal discrimination but placed the ADEA
squarely on the rock of employment discrimination.6 8 While
Yarborough personally might have wished for a broader prohi-
bition, he emphasized that the ADEA applied only in employ-
ment, that it did not require the hiring of an older person who
was not otherwise qualified to perform the job, that it did not
compel the preference of an older worker over a younger one,
and that it did not extend the normal worklife of Americans.
Rather, it would "give every American ... the right to be
equally considered for employment and promotion." 69 Since
66. The congressional focus on the employment ramifications of age dis-
crimination does not lessen the parallel of age to the protected categories of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Instead, the singling out of employment merely means
that the ADEA's analog is title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination
for the protected categories, rather than the entire Civil Rights Act.
67. Yarborough, a Senator from Texas and one of the ADEA's original
sponsors, helped shepard the bill through the Senate. See 113 CONG. REc.
31,248-57 (1967).
68. Id.
69. 113 CONG. REc. 31,251-54 (1967). Discussion about the ADEA in the
House of Representatives also emphasized the need to protect older workers in
the labor market in the same way that other minorities had been protected
under title VII. Representative Burke of Massachusetts, one of the bill's spon-
sors in the House, reflected the confused belief of some that although there was
no prejudice against older Americans, they faced employment discrimination
because of their age and must be protected by Congress. Speaking in favor of
the bill, he said:
Age discrimination is not the same as insidious discrimination based
on race or creed prejudices and bigotry. These discriminations result
in unemployment because of feelings about a person entirely unrelated
to his ability to do a job. This is hardly a problem for the older job-
seeker. Discrimination- arises for him because of assumptions that are
made about the effects of age on performance .... In the last several
years we have done much to bar employment discrimination on race,
religion, color and sex-we must do it for age too.
Id. While Burke apparently did not view age discrimination in the same socie-
tal light as Javits or Yarborough, he clearly believed the ADEA would do for
age what title VII was doing for race, religion, color, and sex.
Burke's comment that age discrimination is not insidious discrimination is
apparently based on the secretary of labor's 1965 report to Congress about the
status of older workers. See id. Some commentators have used Burke's com-
ment and the secretary's assumption that there was no prejudice against older
Americans to conclude not only that there is no prejudice but also that this
lack of prejudice makes age discrimination different from other forms of dis-
crimination. See, e.g., Stanford Note, supra note 9, at 853. Age discrimination,
they contend, merely is based on "misconceptions about the abilities of older
workers." Id. The conclusion that there is no age prejudice is inaccurate. See
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the disparate impact analysis in Griggs refers to the concept of
equal opportunity in title VII,70 Senator Yarborough's emphasis
on equal opportunity for older workers implies that the Griggs
analysis should also apply to the ADEA.
When asked whether the ADEA would conflict with the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its attempt to end discrimination
based on race or color, the sponsors indicated that the two Acts
were not conflicting, but complementary-the ADEA did not
cover race or religion and the Civil Rights Act did not cover
age.7 ' These congressional discussions clearly indicate that
Congress intended the ADEA to rid the workplace of all forms
of age discrimination just as title VII had attacked employment
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, or gender.
3. Similarities of the ADEA and Title VII.
The complementary relationship of the ADEA and title VII
is also revealed by the extent to which courts, using disparate
treatment analysis, have looked to title VII precedents in inter-
preting and applying the ADEA.72 Some critics of Leftwich and
Geller grudgingly accept the use of title VII precedent in
ADEA cases under disparate treatment analysis, but argue that
infra text accompanying notes 88-112. Furthermore, with the exception of
Burke's two sentence reference to the report, members of Congress neither re-
ferred to the secretary's report nor based their discussion on the secretary's as-
sumptions. Instead they stressed the clear economic disadvantages of older
workers vis-a-vis their compatriots and searched for ways to solve that prob-
lem. Schneiderman's conclusions that Congress did not intend the ADEA to be
equivalent to an older American's title VII is based on his reading of the secre-
tary of labor's report rather than the congressional record or the statutes. See
Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 204-09. Similarly, in asserting that age discrimi-
nation deserved "less protection" than race discrimination, he looked to cases
litigating constitutional standards rather than statutory ones. See id. at 206-08;
see infra note 86.
70. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
71. 113 CONG. REc. 31,255 (1967).
72. In interpreting and applying the ADEA under disparate treatment
analysis, some courts simply assumed the link and applied the precedent with-
out commentary. Others, however, stated explicitly that they considered title
VII and the ADEA "equivalent in language or goal." Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Ev-
ans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) ("[T]he ADEA and title VII share a common pur-
pose."); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) ("[Tihe prohibitions of the
ADEA were derived in haec verba from title VII.").
This has led to a string of ADEA cases relying on title VII precedent. For
example, courts have held that the McDonnell Douglas elements of a prima fa-
cie case for race discrimination under disparate treatment should be applied,
with some modifications, to age discrimination because title VII cases are valid
precedent for the ADEA. See, e.g., McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749,
752-54 (5th Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1010 (lst Cir. 1979);
Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Polstorff v.
Fletcher, 452 F. Supp. 17, 23 (N.D. Ala. 1978). But see Mastie v. Great Lakes
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such use of precedent should not be extended to include dispa-
rate impact analysis because age discrimination is different
from title VII discriminations. 73 But the similarities between
the ADEA and title VII are too striking to draw artificial lines
in interpreting the Acts. The nearly identical language of the
two statutes74 as well as the comments made by members of
Congress 75 imply that Congress passed the ADEA in order to
provide the same employment protection to older Americans
that title VII gave to members of nondominant racial, ethnic,
religious, and gender groups.76 As a matter of common sense,
similar language and objectives require similar application.
4. Policy Considerations.
Although the statutory arguments seem compelling, some
commentators have argued that the type of discrimination suf-
fered, rather than the legislation prohibiting that discrimina-
tion, justifies the use of disparate impact analysis in cases
under title VII. According to the advocates of this position, the
disparate impact theory applies under title VII because the in-
dividuals in its protected categories have suffered historical dis-
crimination, invidious social stereotyping, or prejudicial
assumptions about immutable characteristics. Therefore, dis-
parate impact analysis is not available under the ADEA be-
cause older Americans have not faced those problems. 77
Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1307-08 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Liddle, supra note 9, at
558.
Similarly, title VII cases have served as precedent for the evaluation of
burden and allocation of proof under the ADEA, see Anderson v. Savage Labo-
ratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1982); Laugeson v. The Anaconda Co., 510
F.2d 307, 313 (9th Cir. 1975); Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 F. Supp. at 363;
Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1011-12, and for the determination of time limits and filing re-
quirements, see Baruah v. Young, 536 F. Supp. 356, 360-61 (D. Md. 1982); EEOC
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 531 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1981). Also, while the disa-
greement in multimotive title VII cases over the required degree of causality
shows up in ADEA litigation as well, all the ADEA cases acknowledge the title
VII roots of the test therein applied. See Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1010-11; Bentley v.
Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 638 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1981); Smithers v. Bailear,
629 F.2d 892, 896-98 (3d Cir. 1980); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109,
1111-12 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3248 (1981); Laugeson, 510 F.2d
at 313; Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 641 (8th Cir. 1979).
To assert, as some commentators do, that age discrimination is too differ-
ent from title VII discrimination to allow the use of title VII precedents in
ADEA cases is unrealistic in view of this solid wall of precedent. See supra
note 9.
73. See supra note 9.
74. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 53.
77. See McKenry, Enforcement of Age Discrimination in Employment Leg-
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This argument for limiting the use of disparate impact
analysis to certain types of discrimination seems to be based
on a misunderstanding of the development of the theory, the
mistaken application of constitutional standards to statutorily
prohibited discrimination, and the assumption that different
policy considerations underlie the goal of ending different
kinds of discrimination.7 8 A close examination of the early dis-
parate impact cases shows that the Supreme Court's theory
was neither tied to nor based on past discrimination. In
Griggs, for example, the Court emphasized that title VII, on its
face, prohibited employment actions that adversely affected mi-
nority members. The reasons for the adverse effect were not
deemed crucial because "Congress directed the thrust of the
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply
the motivation."79 In other words, the differential impact, not
the reasons for it, constituted the harm in the employment
practice and the violation of title VII. Although it discussed
possible reasons for the differential impact, the Griggs Court
never stated or implied that other minority groups had to prove
similar causes in order to use disparate impact analysis.8O
The Court's use of disparate impact analysis in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States8 l and Dothard
v. Rawlinson82 supports this view. In Teamsters, the Court
found that the company's hiring policy had an illegal discrimi-
natory effect on employees who were black or had Spanish sur-
names. 83 In reaching this result, the Court said nothing about
the decades of discrimination suffered by these racial and eth-
nic minorities or the immutability of skin color or parentage. It
islation, 32 HASTiNGS L.J. 1157, 1167-68 (1981); Schneiderman, supra note 9, at
184, 204-07; Stanford Note, supra note 9, at 850-54.
78. Schneiderman argues that disparate impact analysis should not apply
to ADEA cases because "older workers do not constitute a clearly defined
group with immutable characteristics which has been subject to a history of de-
liberate discrimination." Schneiderman, supra note 9, at 206. Although he
notes that constitutional standards are different from those of a remedial stat-
ute like the ADEA, he uses only constitutional cases to support his view that
the nature of age discrimination precludes a disparate impact analysis. See id.
at 204-14; see also McKenry, supra note 77, at 1167-68; Stanford Note, supra note
9, at 848-54.
79. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
80. "What Congress has commanded is that any test used must measure
the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." Id. at 436.
81. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
82. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
83. The union's seniority system, which had the effect of perpetuating the
company's past discrimination, was immune to prosecution because it was a
bona fide seniority system covered by the title VII exemption. 431 U.S. at 348-
56.
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simply focused on the employment practice's adverse effect on
a protected group.84 Extending the use of disparate impact
analysis to sex discrimination, the Dothard Court declared
minimum height and weight requirements illegal because of
their disparate impact on female applicants, not because past
sex discrimination made women weigh less and have smaller
statures than men. Indeed, the Supreme Court never dis-
cussed "past" discrimination but simply concentrated on the
adverse effects of the employment policy on members of a pro-
tected group.8 5
The commentators' insistence on distinguishing among
types of discrimination also confuses the statutory analysis
used in ADEA cases with the constitutional analysis applied
when the fourteenth amendment is invoked. Under equal pro-
tection analysis, membership in a "suspect" category deter-
mines whether a court applies a strict scrutiny, rational basis,
or middle-tier test.86 In title VII and ADEA litigation, however,
the statute defines the protected group and courts do not vary
their standard of review. 87 Congress may have examined the
84. Id. at 335-39. As a former EEOC Commissioner stated, "the rationale of
Griggs reaches situations in which there has never been a history of overt dis-
criminations." Blumrosen, supra note 55, at 90-91. Even the Stanford Note con-
ceded that adverse impact on minority status could arise as a result of current
cultural deprivation as well as past discrimination. See Stanford Note, supra
note 9, at 851-52.
85. 431 U.S. at 328-32.
86. Under equal protection analysis, the type of test applied (strict scru-
tiny or rational basis) depends on the existence of a suspect category or a fun-
damental interest. If neither is present, courts will apply the rational basis test
under which few laws are struck down. If either is present, however, courts
will use the strict scrutiny test under which few laws survive. The Supreme
Court also may be developing a middle-tier test for categories not quite suspect
but nonetheless needing a closer examination than that of the rational basis
test. Because of these levels of scrutiny, the type of constitutional discrimina-
tion complained of is crucial; it will determine which test is applied and hence
whether the conduct will be prohibited. In determining whether a category is
suspect, the courts look to factors such as whether the group has been politi-
cally powerless or historically subject to discrimination, whether the factor on
which discrimination is based is immutable, irrelevant, or inaccurately stereo-
typed. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for New Equal Protection, 86 HARv. I REV. 1 (1972).
In applying these criteria, the Court has declared that age is not a suspect
category and it will be reviewed under the rational basis test. See Massachu-
setts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976). For an excel-
lent summary of equal protection theory and its effect on the problem of age
discrimination, see Eglit, Of Age and the Constitution, 57 Cmc.-KENT L REV.
859, 872-914 (1981) .
87. Blumrosen discusses this point in regard to title VII. He noted that
Griggs was decided by a Court already shifting to a more restrictive view of
the constitutional rights of minorities. It remained willing, however, to be less
restrictive in regard to statutory rights. See Blumrosen, supra note 55, at 63.
1058 [Vol. 68:1038
DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS
nature or pattern or history of discrimination, but it did so in
order to determine whether a particular group needed protec-
tion. The congressional decision to protect race, national ori-
gin, religion, gender, and age in identical language suggests
that Congress did not intend to create different levels of statu-
tory protection.
Furthermore, neither the legislative history nor the facts of
age discrimination support the commentators' claim that Con-
gress passed the ADEA-rather than simply amending title VII
to include age-because age discrimination is not as persistent,
debilitating, or real as ethnic, race, or gender discrimination.
Admittedly, the general consensus that blacks and women
were, and in some situations still are, subject to widespread
discrimination in the form of racism and sexism 88 was not
matched by a similar understanding of ageism.89 Much discus-
sion about earlier attempts to outlaw age discrimination re-
volved not around how best to solve the problem but whether it
existed.90 Moreover, Congress, in passing the ADEA in 1967,
specifically found that age discrimination did exist in employ-
ment but made no mention of ageism in American society.9 '
That Congress focused on age discrimination in the workplace
instead of ageism throughout society does not imply, however,
that Congress viewed ageism as different or less offensive than
the types of discrimination prohibited by title VII. Even within
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress did not protect sex and
religion in the same ways it protected race and national ori-
gin.92 Thus the emphasis on employment discrimination may
88. This consensus was (and is) much less clear with regard to women.
While most would agree in 1970 that women were treated differently, not every-
one viewed that different treatment as discrimination. For example, the sev-
enth edition of Webster's Dictionary (1971) defined racism but not sexism and
its definition of stereotype included race as an example but not gender. See
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGATE DICTIONARY (1971). Furthermore, the
Civil Rights Act itself and the debate generated by it were probably important
in developing a broader awareness that the different treatment of blacks, wo-
men, and others was discriminatory. Before the Act's passage in 1964, many
viewed such different treatment as merely a justifiable result of physical
differences.
89. Some of the comments about ageism in the 1960s and 1970s are remi-
niscent of those about racism in the 1940s and 1950s.
90. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967).
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982); 113 CONG. REC. 31,252-253 (1967).
92. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race,
color, or national origin in all sections of the Act, but prohibits religious dis-
crimination only in the public accommodations, public facilities, public educa-
tion, and equal employment opportunities sections, and discrimination based
on sex only in the public education and equal employment opportunities sec-
tions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-f (1976).
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reflect congressional concern about the economic effects of dis-
crimination rather than a belief that older Americans are not a
minority group 93 subject to persistent, debilitating, and real
discrimination.
Although the legislative history of the ADEA provides no
guidance about age discrimination outside the realm of employ-
ment, many sociologists and gerontologists view older Ameri-
cans as a distinct minority94 noting that, like blacks and
93. A commonly accepted definition of "minority group" is "a group of peo-
ple who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out
from others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treat-
ment and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimina-
tion." F. DAVIS, MiNo rry-DoMINANT RELATONS 4 (1978) (quoting Wirth, The
Problem of Minority Groups, in THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WoRLD CIsIS 347
(R. Linton ed. 1945)). According to this view, minority status is not a matter of
inferior numbers but a relative lack of power in society. Any group that is not
allowed full access to the political, social, or economic rewards of society be-
cause its members share a physical or cultural characteristic not valued by
those who hold power is a minority. See id. at 3-17.
The concept of a minority group as a perception of the distribution of bene-
fits is an important way to view inequality because it focuses on the treatment
of the group members and alerts the observer to the fact that the treatment is
due to some distinguishing factor such as skin color, parentage, or gender, over
which the individual has no control. Differential treatment in this sense can be
viewed as a societal problem in general rather than the individual's having
done something, or not done something, to merit such treatment. See J. LEVIN
& W. LEVIN, AGEISM: PREJUDICE AND DIsCRIMINATION AGAINST THE ELDERLY 65-
66 (1980) (summary of the current literature on minority group status).
The minority group approach is radically different from that of victim-blam-
ing, which explains inequality, deprivation, and prejudice by the lack of oppor-
tunities available to the minority because of their minority status. This circular
reasoning allows the dominant group to be sympathetic to the problems arising
from inequality without being compelled to do anything about them. Levine
clearly summarized this approach as "[bIlaming the victim for the problem he
or she suffers is merely a matter of identifying those characteristics which dis-
tinguish the individual from the rest of the population and proposing how the
problem may result from this. Id. at 37. A thorough examination of this issue
can be found in W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (1971). Ryan demonstrates how
"solutions" to "minority problems" depend on the underlying approach. For
example, toddlers in inner city ghettos have an abnormally high incidence of
lead poisoning because of eating lead paint chips from flaking walls. Rather
than develop a program to provide better housing or at least require landlords
to remove lead-based paint from rented dwellings, the solution found was a
program to educate mothers to keep their children from eating the paint.
94. See, e.g., Barron, Minority Group Characteristics of the Aged in Ameri-
can Society, 8 J. OF GERONT. 477, 477-82 (1953); F. DAVIS, supra note 93, at 4; J.
LEVIN & W. LEVIN, supra note 93, at 66; Birren & Loucks, Age Related Change
and the Individual, 57 Cmic.-KENT L. REV. 833, 833-44 (1981); Neugarten, Age
Distinctions and their Social Functions, 57 CHic.-KENT L. REV. 809, 815-29
(1981); Palmore & Whittington, Trends in the Relative Status of the Aged, 50 So-
cial Forces 84, 84-91 (1971); Rosow, Old Age: One Moral Dilemma of an Affluent
Society, 2 J. GERONT. 182, 182-95 (1962).
The most influential gerontologist to deny minority group status to the ag-
ing is Gordon Streib. Streib asserts that the aging are not a minority group be-
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women, older Americans face discrimination because of inaccu-
rate stereotypes. For these experts, the immutability demand
of the disparate impact critics95 is irrelevant to the reality of
ageism. Indeed, requiring immutability makes no sense in
either the context of minority groups generally or older Ameri-
cans specifically. For example, neither blacks nor hispanics
were members of a minority group until they came to the
United States. That a Mexican-American has lived in this
country for only five years does not lessen the ethnic prejudice
directed against that person today.9 6 Similarly, that older per-
sons are old for only a portion of their lives does not mitigate
the discrimination they face in their later years. Once individu-
als cross the biological age line, they are considered "old"-re-
gardless of their individual characteristics. In each case
societal perceptions of the person change although the individ-
ual has not.9 7
cause they exhibit no group consciousness, are not negatively stereotyped, are
not discriminated against because of age, and do not spend their entire lives as
old people. Streib, Are the Aged a Minority Group, in MIDDLE AGE AND AGING
35, 35-46 (1965). These criteria closely parallel those used by the disparate im-
pact critics to argue that age discrimination is dissimilar to title VII discrimina-
tions. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Streib, however, may very
well be misconstruing group consciousness and its application to older Ameri-
cans. See J. LEvIN & W. LEvN, supra note 93, at 66-69. Group consciousness
can take two forms-an attempt to reject membership in one's group because
of the prejudice and discrimination one faces or banding together in an attempt
to change society or otherwise overcome that prejudice and discrimination.
Blacks have done both. Thousands "passed" while others joined groups rang-
ing from the NAACP to the Black Panthers. Older Americans also approach
the issue from both sides. Some "pass," or attempt to pass, for younger while
others band together in groups ranging from retirment communities to the
Gray Panthers. Id. at 66-69.
95. Liddele, supra note 9, at 551; McKenry, supra note 77, at 1166-69;
Schneidermann, supra note 9, at 204, 206.
96. Similarly, a person who has lived as a white and looks white may sud-
denly be considered a black and face prejudice for the first time. For decades
many states statutorily defined race (Caucasian and Negro) based on the race
of one's ancestors. A mulatto had one Negro parent, a quadroon had one Negro
grandparent and an octodroon had one Negro great-grandparent. In most south-
ern states all of these were considered Negro and even individuals with only
one Negro great, great grandparent were often legally defined as Negro. Many
such "legal Negroes" did not "look" black and hence "passed" as white, unless
or until exposed by a birth certificate. See generally STATES LAws ON RACE AND
COLOR (P. Murray ed. 1950 & Supp. 1955) (survey of state laws). A similar stat-
utory definition of race was developed in Germany in the 1930s. The Nurem-
berg Laws of 1935, for example, declared all individuals with at least three
Jewish grandparents to be Jewish. Subsequently, the Nazi persecution was di-
rected also at people with fewer Jewish ancestors. As a result, many Germans
who had been Christian or atheist for two generations and who had mantained
no cultural contact with their ethnic heritage suddenly "became" Jewish. See
H. HOLBORN, III A HISTORY OF MODERN GERmANY 759-60 (1969).
97. Age and its meaning are socially defined. All societies develop age sta-
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Equally without foundation is the belief that ageism is not
real discrimination because its stereotypes are neither harmful
nor pervasive nor rooted in the past.98 Stereotypes about older
people, whether recent or ancient, are plentiful and frequently
are used to justify the discrimination against them.99 In the
last thirty years, research about age stereotypes and their va-
lidity has shown that most individuals have specific beliefs
about older people, that they respond to elders based on those
beliefs, that most of those beliefs are inaccurate, and that the
stereotypes have changed little during almost three decades.100
For example, older people are perceived as set in their ways,
conservative, disliking change, physically and mentally inactive
(if not incapacitated), and generally without much to offer
those around them.10 1 Because of this perception, youth is pre-
ferred and older people are excluded.10 2 Yet a number of stud-
tus systems which distribute rights, rewards, and responsibilities to people ac-
cording to their socially defined age groups. See Neugarten, supra note 94, at
814-19. From this system developed age distinctions which have attached spe-
cific expectations and norms of appropriate behavior. Who falls in what cate-
gory, and what is or is not appropriate, changes from time to time and place to
place. Id. But, when such structures remain stable, there is a tendency to use
age as a proxy for certain characteristics. So, instead of certain age groups be-
ing given X responsibilities and privileges, a member of the age group is as-
sumed to have those characteristics simply because he or she is a member of
that group. In other words, age has no set characteristics (at least up to a cer-
tain point). If it did, old people in all societies would be the same. The inher-
ent inaccuracy of characteristics ascribed to the elderly is shown by various
aspects of age (biological, psychological, and social) changing over time and at
different rates. See Birren & Loucks, supra note 94, at 814.
98. Since the perception of the meaning of age is a product of a particular
time in any given society, the attempt to distinguish ageism because it has no
lengthy past misses the point. In preindustrial western societies and in
nonwestern industrial societies such as Japan, increased age generally brought
status, power, and privilege. It is the special mix of economic and social trends
with western tradition that resulted in the development of ageism in America
in recent decades. That it is relatively new makes it no less real.
99. The theme that age discrimination is not age discrimination but merely
different treatment of older Americans because they are old is an all too com-
mon one. For example, "[T]here is an inherent correlation between age and
ability." Stanford Note, supra note 9, at 850. Some, like Peter Schuck, argue
that age discrimination is not invidious because it brings primarily benefits,
such as Social Security and nursing homes for the elderly, and thus is "good"
discrimination. See Schuck, Age Discrimination Revisited, 57 Cmc.-KENT L
REV. 1029, 1030-34 (1981). To argue that the presence of benefits "makes up for"
discrimination sounds much like mid-19th century slaveowners telling aboli-
tionists that while slavery reduced the personal freedom of blacks it was still in
their best interests because their owners provided them with food, clothing,
and shelter.
100. See J. LEviN & W. LEvN, supra note 93, at 70-96.
101. See id. at 73-85.
102. For comments about the relationship between stereotyping and dis-
crimination, see id. at 76-78
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ies suggest that older people are as productive, intelligent, and
politically liberal as younger adults. 0 3 Nonetheless, the mis-
perceptions abound and continue to disadvantage older
Americans. 0 4
This disadvantage is starkly visible in the economic sphere.
The labor force participation rate of those over sixty-five has
dropped dramatically in thirty years, from 27.2% in 1947 to
17.2% in 1967 to 13.8% in 1975.105 The patterns for both the
forty-five to fifty-four age group and the fifty-five to sixty-four
age group reflect an increase from 1947 to 1969, then by 1975 a
decrease for the older group to the 1947 level, and a steady but
slightly lower participation rate for the younger group.l0 6
When these groups are broken down by gender, however, an
even gloomier picture emerges for older male workers. In both
categories the labor force participation rate for males dropped,
dramatically for the fifty-five to sixty-four age group and signifi-
cantly for the forty-five to fifty-four age group. 0 7 But for the
substantial influx of older women into the labor market, both
the fifty-four to sixty-five and forty-five to fifty-four age groups
would have experienced an overwhelming overall decline. 0 8
The severity of this shift cannot be explained by demo-
graphic changes or the allure of retiring early and receiving So-
cial Security and other "old age benefits." Indeed, with other
factors held constant, the aging of the American population
103. Id. at 78-85.
104. It seems clear that ageism is primarily a twentieth century phenome-
non in America. It is unclear, however, whether it is increasing. See id. at 87-
91; Gottlieb & Anderson, History, Incidence, and Effects of Age Discrimination
in Employmen in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER PERSONS: A
REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT 5-8 (1977)
(summary of the research discussing factors which encourage ageism and
those which militate against it).
105. Id. at 13.
106. Id.
107. These figures partially explain the fact that males are four times as
likely as females to bring an ADEA suit. See Schuster, Analyzing Age Discrim-
ination Cases: Development of a Methodology, 4 LAW & PoL'Y Q. 339, 344 (1982).
108. See Gottlieb & Anderson, supra note 104, at 15-16 & app. table 1. The
substantial increase in the number and proportion of women in the labor mar-
ket after World War II resulted from a variety of factors. The most significant
factor for the analysis of age discrimination is that the labor force as a whole
has become proportionately younger and that trend would be even more
marked had not there been a large number of women over 45 entering the mar-
ket. Some of these women entered the job market after raising families or after
the divorce or death of a spouse left them without financial support. Although
older, they tend to compete with younger workers to fill the primarily lower sal-
ary, nonexperienced jobs. It is unlikely that these older women displace older
males in the job market.
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should have resulted in an increasing rather than decreasing
proportion of older Americans in the work force. 109 And to sug-
gest that the lower participation rate results from the desire
and ability of older Americans to retire "young" ignores eco-
nomic reality: older Americans are not retiring on a cushion of
financial security.110 In 1970, persons over sixty-five, whether
head of household or single, had a lower median income than
younger people. At the same time, 27.3% of older Americans
lived in poverty while only 8.2% of their younger compatriots
did."' Social Security has undeniably eased the way for some
Americans but it has also institutionalized old age at sixty-two
or sixty-five years of age and thus denied many older Ameri-
cans any choice about working. Thus, although older Ameri-
cans now comprise a larger share of the total population both
numerically and proportionately, their role in the workforce
and their share in society's tangible economic benefits have
declined.
These unfavorable employment statistics, economic indica-
tors, and survey data reflect widespread discrimination against
older Americans. Employers are not rejecting older workers in
favor of younger ones because the latter can outperform the
former. Rather, they respond to older workers based on their
stereotypic assumptions about aging. Like subjects in experi-
ments, employers avoid older workers because of false percep-
tions about their physical, mental, and emotional
capabilities.112 They look at chronological age and not at the
109. The postwar baby boom created an anomalous demographic bulge for
the current generation of workers 30 to 40 years old. Nonetheless, changing
mores, prosperity, birth control, and medical advances have combined to alter
the pattern of American population growth. Fewer children are born and more
adults live longer than ever before. The result is a clear demographic shift to
the upper age categories. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 29-30 (1980).
110. See supra note 99.
111. See Gottlieb & Anderson, supra note 104, at 7-24.
112. One study on the effects of age stereotypes on employment decisions
showed that age significantly affected how individuals might be characterized.
A group of realtors and business students were asked to indicate the extent to
which a number of characteristics applied to a 60 year-old man and a 30 year-
old man. The older man received favorable ratings only for reliability and hon-
esty; he was rated negatively in regard to capacity for job performance and po-
tential for development. He was also seen as accident prone, rigid, and
dogmatic. The younger man, on the other hand, was seen as more productive,
efficient, motivated, capable of working under pressure, future-time oriented,
open to new ideas, capable of learning, adaptable, and versatile. See J. LEvIN &
W. LEviN supra note 93, at 76-78. In another study, business students were
asked to make managerial decisions about certain employment issues. When a
computer programmer whose technical skills had become obsolete was de-
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person, just as many employers once looked at skin color or
gender rather than capability.
These considerations show that age discrimination cannot
be distinguished from other forms of discrimination in a way
that permits rejection of disparate impact analysis in ADEA
cases. Courts have developed and applied disparate impact
analysis to prevent the disproportionate impact of policies on
members of a protected group-regardless of why Congress
gave that group statutory protection. Furthermore, although
Congress did not examine age discrimination outside of the
work place, research suggests that stereotypes based on age
not only exist but result in discrimination. Like blacks and wo-
men, older Americans are treated differently because of their
group membership.
III. CLOSING THE BACK DOOR: A STANDARD FOR
ESTABLISHING THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AND
ITS REBUTTAL IN ADEA DISPARATE
IMPACT CASES
Once a court has held that an ADEA plaintiff can rely on
the disparate impact theory, it must decide what proves, re-
buts, or exempts a disparate impact. Predictably, the eviden-
tiary problems encountered in title VII disparate impact cases
also arise in ADEA cases. Both the role of statistics in estab-
lishing a prima facie case and the role of the statutory and judi-
cial exemptions need clarification.
A. ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FAciE CASE WrI STAnSTICS
Under disparate impact theory, a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case by demonstrating that a neutral policy ad-
versely affects a protected group differently than it does others.
Thus a would-be plaintiff faces two threshold issues: what
benchmarkn13 best reflects the expected nondiscriminatory re-
sult, and what statistical measure best compares the em-
ployer's workforce with that benchmark.
The benchmark issue is particularly bewildering in employ-
scribed as 30 years old, students were more likely to suggest providing training,
transfer, or promotion opportunities than when he was described as 60 years
old. Indeed, in the latter case, the likely response was to ignore or fire him. See
id..
113. A benchmark is "a point of reference from which measurements of any
sort may be made." WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTioNARY 79
(1971). In this Note, benchmark refers to the standard group against which
subgroups of employees are compared.
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ment discrimination cases11 4 because the possible group com-
parisons seem limitless.115 The employer's work force might be
compared to the general population, the labor force, the quali-
fied labor force, the qualified and interested labor force, the ap-
plicants, the qualified applicants, persons offered the job, or
persons actually hired (or promoted or fired). The geographi-
cal boundaries of this benchmark might be local, regional, or
national. The federal courts generally adopt the qualified labor
force as the appropriate benchmark, but determine the specific
qualifications and geographic boundaries on a case-by-case
basis."16
For hiring or firing decisions,"17 use of the qualified labor
114. The issue of a correct benchmark is the same under disparate treat-
ment analysis.
115. One's view of how the economic system and job market work also can
affect the choice of a benchmark. See Smith & Abram, Quantitative Analysis
and Proof of Employment Discrimination, 1981 U. ILL L F. 33, 36-48 (1981).
Such an influence, however, is inappropriate in disparate impact cases because
the underlying assumption that employers cannot be neutral in employment
decisions is diametrically opposed to the statutory purpose of neutrality at
least in regard to the protected categories. In the employment setting, the legal
requirement of neutrality outweighs theories or beliefs about how the eco-
nomic structure should or might best function. Smith and Abram discuss sta-
tistical analysis of employment discrimination from the perspective of a free
market economy without considering social or government policies, such as an-
titrust or discrimination laws, that put limits on what an employer may do. See
id. at 33-35.
116. For example, the Griggs standards were quite vague. The two ques-
tioned employment requirements were a high school diploma and a passing
score on a general ability test. The Court discussed the relevant statistics and
the employee group/labor market comparison in one footnote where it referred
to 1960 census statistics showing that 34% of white North Carolina males but
only 12% of black North Carolina males had high school diplomas. It also noted
that 58% of the white applicants passed the required test but only 6% of the
black applicants did so. After noting that this disproportionate impact was dis-
criminatory, the Court concentrated its remaining efforts on explaining why
neither requirement fell under the business necessity exception. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-36 (1971). Dothard addressed the issue more
directly. It accepted the use of general population statistics rather than those
describing only the actual applicants because the questioned policy was an ini-
tial bar and hence might discourage many individuals from even applying
which would distort the actual applicant pool. Also, national data was consid-
ered reliable absent any showing that Alabamians differed markedly from the
national population. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977). Simi-
larly, Teamsters relied on general population statistics as a benchmark because
the jobs in question were entry level positions requiring few skills but noted
that if the employer had reason to believe these were not an accurate reflection
of the qualified applicants, such evidence would be relevant. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977). Hazelwood
added that such general statistics were not generally appropriate when the job
required special qualifications. Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433
U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977). See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
117. Promotion or demotion decisions must take into account the composi-
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force avoids both over- and under-inclusiveness. For example,
if a more narrow measure, such as job applicants, were
adopted, an employer could distort the benchmark by minimiz-
ing its recruitment of protected group members.118 Also, em-
ployers often do not keep records compiling such data. Even if
they did, potential plaintiffs usually would not have access to
the information unless they had already shown sufficient cause
to proceed with discovery. Using the qualified labor force, on
the other hand, allows a potential plaintiff relatively easy ac-
cess to the necessary data in the form of census reports and in-
formation collected by labor and professional organizations."19
At the same time, the qualified labor force avoids over-inclu-
siveness by tying job qualifications to the decisionmaking pro-
cess. Thus this standard does not require an employer to
match its work force to the population but only mandates that
the employer choose from the entire pool.120
To define the qualified labor force, one must identify the
specific job qualifications and the relevant geographic market.
Job qualifications range from none to various levels of educa-
tional, physical, emotional, and personal achievement. For a
given geographic area, jobs with few requirements have a broad
pool of qualified applicants; increasing the minimum qualifica-
tions shrinks the qualified pool.
The geographic constraints are likely to move in the oppo-
site direction. As the minimum qualifications increase, the la-
bor pool decreases and hence an employer may need to draw
from a larger geographic area. In addition, the employer's past
practice or location of recruiting and the number of available
positions may affect the relevant geographic market.121 As-
tion of the employer's actual workforce as well. See Smith & Abram, supra
note 115, at 62-64.
118. B. ScHT i & P. GROSSMAN, EmpLOymE DISCRmmNATION LAw 1349 (2d
ed. 1983).
119. Both the availability and timeliness of the data will sometimes restrict
the choices of benchmark. See id. at 1358-67. This discussion assumes that the
data is available and that it reflects current conditions.
120. Id. Smith and Abram argue that even in a world of neutral employers,
differing "skill[s], education, experience and work preferences between men
and women, minorities and nonminorities, will affect relative earnings and em-
ployment." Smith & Abram, supra note 115, at 38, 54-59. This problem disap-
pears when the qualified labor market is used as the appropriate benchmark.
Even in cases using general population figures, it is not as crucial as Smith and
Abram imply because the employer can rebut a prima facie case by showing
that necessary job requirements were not fulfilled by the protected group.
121. B. Sczmi & P. GROssMAN, supra note 118, at 1361-64. Such factors are
necessary because the determination of appropriate geographic bounds may be
complicated by inconsistent demographic patterns. For example, a crucial is-
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sume an employer that currently draws its work force from sev-
eral surrounding states, recruits on college campuses
nationwide, and wants to hire eight chemical engineers with
graduate training. The high number of positions, the substan-
tial educational requirements, and the employer's past regional
hiring practice and current national hiring effort suggest a
benchmark of all chemical engineers in the country with gradu-
ate training (the potential qualified labor force). On the other
hand, if an employer who traditionally has advertised and hired
locally needs one person to fill an entry level job requiring few
or no skills, the qualified labor market would probably consist
of the town's unskilled workers.
Having determined the benchmark, the plaintiff must still
present statistical evidence of a disparate impact. Under dispa-
rate treatment analysis, plaintiffs use statistical evidence infer-
entially to show that the treatment of their class is so different
from the treatment of other employees that the employer must
have intended the differential treatment. This analysis re-
quires that Congress or the courts decide what level of differ-
ence is sufficiently high to create an inference of intent. In
short, the statistical analysis shows the degree of differential
treatment, while the policy analysis determines what level of
difference is legally sufficient to infer bad motive. As might be
expected, there is a great deal of uncertainty about what level
is or should be appropriate. 22
sue in Hazelwood was whether the applicant/employee group was to be mea-
sured against the qualified labor force in the county or the county and city
combined. This was important because the proportion of blacks in the city was
substantially different than in the county. 433 U.S. at 310-12.
122. The courts have neither established a specific standard nor agreed
upon a statistical measure. Both are decided on a case-by-case basis, with only
vague guidance. Teamsters talked only of gross statistical disparities, 431 U.S.
at 339 n.20, while Hazelwood reiterated the Teamsters guideline but also sug-
gested that the "two or three standard deviation" disparity mentioned in Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), might be appropriate as well, 433 U.S. at
309 n.14. Disparate treatment cases make up the overwhelming proportion of
cases discussing the issue of statistical standard. This is at least partially due
to the theoretical basis of inferring intent, which engenders controversy about
a "sufficient" level. See generally W. COmOLLY & D. PETERSON, USE OF STATIS-
TIcs iN EQUAL EMPLoYMENT OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION (1982); B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSsMAN, supra note 118, 1347-67; Bompey & Saltman, The Role of Statistics in
Employment Litigation-A University Perspective, 9 J.C. & U.L. 263 (1982-83)
(The Supreme Court agrees that "gross disparities" or a differential of two or
three standard deviations is enough to infer discrimination but has not yet de-
veloped a specific standard.); Grady, Statistics in Employment Discrimination,
30 LAB. LJ. 748 (1979) (Courts demand increasingly sophisticated statistical
analysis and attorneys must learn how to use these tools.); McGuire, The Use of
Statistics in Title VII Cases, 30 LAB. L.J. 361 (1979) (Teamsters and Hazelwood
provide only general guidelines about the required degree of disparity but em-
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This uncertainty need not and should not be allowed to
spread to employment discrimination cases analyzed under
disparate impact theory. As the Supreme Court recently noted,
disparate impact analysis involves different issues and evi-
dence than disparate treatment.123 Disparate impact theory
uses statistical theory not to infer the motive of an employer
but rather to describe the result of a policy. Underlying the
theory is the policy judgment of Congress and the courts that
employers cannot use facially neutral employment policies that
disproportionately affect a protected class. Legally this means
that, absent a business necessity reason or RFOA,124 a group of
employees should reflect the composition of its appropriate
benchmark, at least in terms of the protected category. 25 Sta-
tistics enable courts to discover any difference between the two
groups.
The Supreme Court, however, has not clarified the meaning
of the term "significantly different," its test for adverse im-
pact.12 6 Although courts could develop a "disparity level" test
similar to that used in disparate treatment theory, both the the-
oretical basis of disparate impact and the appropriate statistical
theories support a more direct and straightforward approach. 2 7
phasize the problem of determining the relevant job market); Portwood &
Koziara, In Search of Equal Employment Opportunity: New Interpretations of
Title VII, 30 LAB. L.J. 353 (1979) (recent court decisions give defendants greater
latitude in proving job relatedness and business necessity while also moving
away from deference to EEOC interpretative guidelines about statistical stan-
dards); Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Pro-
cedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 Tux. L. Rav. 1
(1977) (Statistical evidence of disparity can be used to infer intent under dispa-
rate treatment or show differential effect under disparate impact; the difference
between the two theories should be the different evidence which a defendant
can use to rebut each prima facie case.).
123. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252
n.5 (1981).
124. See infra notes 132-150 and accompanying text.
125. Thus if older persons comprise 20% of the qualified labor force, one
would expect the employer's work force to be about 20% older persons.
126. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 426, 430 & n.6 (1971); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
127. Although "significant disparity level" is appropriate terminology in dis-
parate treatment cases, it adds confusion to the term "significant" in disparate
impact analysis, particularly when courts or federal guidelines talk about levels
of disparity as "so significant as to show adverse impact." While significance in
disparate treatment is a policy judgment about the level of disparity needed to
infer intent, significance in disparate impact is a statistical term with a specific
meaning. The two theories must be kept strictly separate in order to avoid mis-
application of definitions, standards, and tests. See infra note 128.
At least one commentator has already criticized the blurring of lines be-
tween the two analyses which may have already undercut the business neces-
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To find whether a disparate impact exists, the test need only
discover if the policy affects the protected category and the rest
of the employer's work force differently and, if so, whether that
difference could have resulted by chance.128 As noted above,
statistical analysis of the employer's work force and the appro-
priate benchmark can reveal such differences. More impor-
tantly, that same analysis also provides a determination of
whether the difference is irrelevant because it occurred by
chance or statistically significant because it resulted from some
factor other than chance.129 Interpreting the Supreme Court
sity exclusion used in disparate impact analysis. See Note, supra note 25, at
416-19.
Confusion about the theoretical basis of each theory is also responsible for
a battle of the printed word between Professors Shoben and Cohn. Compare
Cohn, On the Use of Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, 55 IND. L.J.
493 (1980) (many current measures cannot be used to show adverse impact be-
cause of inappropriate statistical assurances and inferences) with Shoben, In
Defense of Disparate Impact Analysis under title VII. A Reply to Dr. Cohn, 55
IND. L.J. 515 (1980) (Cohn's conclusions are based on a misunderstanding of the
legal principles and his statistical model is aimed at only intentional discrimi-
nation, that is, the kind analyzed under disparate treatment theory) with Cohn,
Statistical Laws and the Use of Statistics in Law: A Rejoinder to Professor
Shoben, 55 IND. L.J. 537 (1980) (if statutes are to be litigated with the use of sta-
tistics, they must be framed in ways that underlying theories can be statisti-
cally tested).
128. It is important to emphasize that the level of disparity does not play
the same theoretical role under disparate impact analysis as it does under dis-
parate treatment. With disparate impact, the issue is conceptually framed in
terms of whether or not there is disparity. In that setting the only level that
should be at issue is the amount of risk considered safe in concluding that the
disparity did not occur by chance. That decision can be guided by standards
from social science research where the usual levels are 95%, 98%, or 99% (i.e.
significance levels of .05, .02, or .01). See generally W. CONNOLLY & D. PETERSON,
supra note 122, at § 8.04; A. LARSON & L. LARSON, 3 EMPLOYMENT DIscRnMNA-
TION § 74 (1983).
129. In statistical terminology, this process is called hypothesis testing
(sometimes called rejection of the null hypothesis). This is done by assuming
that the opposite of the primary hypothesis (called the null hypothesis) is true
and comparing it with the data in hopes of being able to reject it at a specified
level of probablity that such a rejection would be wrong. This seemingly circu-
lar approach is necessary because probabilities of error can be calculated only
for rejected hypotheses. The original hypothesis is not "proven" (nor can it
ever be) but is supported by the rejection of its opposite at a 5% or 1%
probability of having wrongly rejected it. Thus, while it is impossible to prove
that two groups are the same, it is possible to support the inference that they
are the same by showing that in rejecting the null hypothesis that they are dif-
ferent, there is only a X% chance of making a mistake. For additional discus-
sion of hypothesis testing and significance levels, see A. JOHNSON, SOCIAL
STATISTICS WITH=U TEARS ch. 12 (1977); H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS chs. 8-
21 (1961); H. LOETHER & D. McTAVIsH, INFERENTIAL STATISTICS FOR SOCIOLO-
GISTS chs. 6-9 (1974); S. SIEGEL, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAV-
IORAL SCIENCES chs. 2-3 (1956); J. TwArrE & J. MONROE, INTRODUCTORY
STATISTICS chs. 6-7 (1979); Smith & Abram, supra note 115, at 36-54.
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test of disparate impact as requiring statistical significance
therefore provides a theoretically and statistically sound ap-
proach to disparate impact cases.
This statistical approach would work in both title VII and
ADEA cases, although the method of measuring group mem-
bership differs. The protected category under the ADEA, peo-
ple from forty to seventy, is measured on a continuum while
race and gender tend to be dichotomous.130 This distinction,
however, affects neither the statutory nor the theoretical basis
for using disparate impact analysis in ADEA cases. It merely
means that the statistical test for determining disparity in
ADEA cases is different than that used for a dichotomous vari-
able.131 Thus, whether the protected class is based on age,
race, or gender, a prima facie case of employment discrimina-
tion under disparate impact analysis is established by a statis-
tical measure indicating that the questioned policy
disproportionately affects the protected class in a way not ex-
plained by chance.
B. EXEMPTIONS: BusINEss NEcEssrrY AND THE RFOA
In defending an ADEA case under disparate impact analy-
sis, an employer can turn to either the judicially created busi-
ness necessity defense 3 2 or the statutorily based reasonable
factor other than age (RFOA) exemption.13 3 As with the stan-
130. Race, of course, can cover several categories (Black, Spanish sur-
named, Asian surnamed, Native American, etc.) but is usually found in a di-
chotomous setting or at least treated as dichotomous. For example, one court
that dealt with three racial groups (White, Black, Spanish-surnamed) com-
bined the two minority groups into one since the different impact affected them
both. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). This di-
chotomous view of race, however, may have to change in the future as
America's urban areas increasingly become centers where minorities compete
with each other for jobs and social services.
131. In statistical research, variables measured on a continuum are often
preferred over dichotomous ones because a wider variety of more sophisticated
statistical theories can be applied to the former. In short, they provide more
measureable information subject to a wider variation of manipulation. Contin-
uous variables can be examined on the basis of the whole continuum from
measures such as regression analysis or on ranked subcategories (e.g., 40-45,
45-50) through measures such as the Mann-Whitney-Wflcoxen Rank Survey
Test or the Kolmogorow-Smirnov Test. See W. CoNNo..Y & D. PETERSON,
supra note 122, at §§ 10.05, 11.0-.10. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Pro-
ceedings, 80 CoLum. L REV. 702 (1980); Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of
Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 Colo. L.
Rev. 737 (1980). For additional sources examining relevant statistical measures,
see also supra note 129.
132. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, at 431 (1971).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1982). Because dismissal or discipline for cause
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dards for statistical analysis, however, the courts have not
agreed on guidelines for applying these defenses.
Business necessity, which is sometime used interchangea-
bly with "job-relatedness," 3 4 was developed in Griggs as a de-
fense to a prima facie finding of adverse impact on a protected
group: "[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices which are fair in form, but discriminatory in op-
eration. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohib-
ited."135 In Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, the Supreme
Court refined the definition of business necessity and held that
once the defendant proved necessity, the plaintiff could prevail
only by showing a less discriminatory alternative.13 6
By applying the Albemarle tests for business necessity and
allocations of burden to ADEA cases, both the Geller 3 7 and
Leftwich 138 courts logically extended the judicially created title
VII defense.139 Nothing about age discrimination or the ADEA
is a subcategory of factors that can be considered "a reasonable factor other
than age," this Note treats these two statutory exceptions as one. The presence
of the dismissal for cause clause apparently results from the ADEA's sponsors'
desire to assure congressional sceptics that the statute would not force employ-
ers to hire or retain unqualified workers. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967). The
BFOQ defense, because it allows the use of age, is inapplicable in disparate im-
pact cases, which concern the use of nonage factors that have an adverse effect
on elder workers. See B. SCHLEI & P. GRossMAN, supra note 118, at 504-05.
134. In Griggs, job-relatedness was part of the business necessity standard
in that the questioned test could hardly be considered necessary to the opera-
tion of the business if it were not related to the job for which the applicant was
applying. Although courts sometimes use the terms interchangeably, the con-
sensus is that job-relatedness is one way to show business necessity. Id. at
1328-29. Some commentators advocate that job-relatedness be used only in a
testing context. See, e.g., Note, supra note 25, at 402-03.
135. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
136. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Burdine does
not alter the burden shifts developed since 1972 because it does not apply to
cases brought under disparate impact analysis. See supra note 15. The
Supreme Court has defined business necessity as a policy or requirement "nec-
essary to safe and efficient job performance," Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 331-32 n.14 (1977). One commentator argues that business necessity should
not be defined solely as job-relatedness because it would violate the holding of
Albemarle, which discusses job-relatedness only with regard to an employment
test, and result in an overly broad application of the exemption. See Note,
supra note 25 at 402-03. Citing both Albemarle and Dothard, he urges that job-
relatedness be used only in a testing context and business necessity in nontest-
ing contexts. Id.
137. Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032-34 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 945 (1981).
138. Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691-93 (8th Cir.
1983).
139. The only commentary focusing on the use of a business necessity ex-
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statute suggests that Congress intended greater protection for
older persons than for persons protected by title VII. More-
over, in developing both the disparate impact theory and the
business necessity defense in Griggs, the Supreme Court bal-
anced the statutory employment rights of the title VII pro-
tected groups with the legitimate business needs of the
employers. The same balance and protection are needed in age
discrimination cases.
It has been argued that business necessity is too high a
standard for ADEA defendants because the RFOA exemption
is preemptive and requires only "reasonableness."140 However,
in defining its "reasonable" standard, this theory relies on the
constitutional three-tier analysis and analogizes its standard to
the middle tier.141 Thus, this approach disregards the distinc-
tion between statutory and constitutional analysis and stan-
dards, 42 while also ignoring the statutory location of the
exemption and congressional intent. Section 623 of the ADEA
contains the RFOA and the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) exemptions: An otherwise prohibited action will not
be unlawful "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business, or when the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other the age."' 43 The placement of the BFOQ and
RFOA exceptions in the same subsection, combined by the dis-
junctive "or," clearly indicates that Congress intended two ex-
emption in ADEA cases appeared in 1979. See Note, The Cost of Growing Old:
Business Necessity and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 88 YALE
LJ. 565 (1979). The discussion emphasizes the degree to which cost could be
an appropriate business necessity or RFOA. Unfortunately, the Note does not
address directly the issue of disparate impact theory and its analysis fluctuates
between a disparate treatment approach and one implying disparate impact.
Within these limitations, its comments about cost and older workers are useful.
140. Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Is a Transplant Appropriate? 14 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 1261,
1278-79 (1983). Player also asserts that "courts have yet to address a true [dis-
parate] impact case, a case involving the utilization of a truly age neutral crite-
ria." Id. at 1278 (emphasis added). Unfortunately his point is based on two
misconceptions: his belief that Geller and Leftwich as well as Allison and Mas-
sarsky were decided on the basis of disparate treatment rather than disparate
impact and his belief that a neutral criterion for age can be neutral only if it
has no correlation with age. Id at 1274-78. His first comment is explained only
by an assumption that he misread the four cases, in terms of both theory and
facts. The second comment simply makes no sense because the whole point of
disparate impact analysis is to examine facially neutral policies that in effect
are related to the protected status.
141. See id at 1278-83.
142. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1982).
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emptions. To read the RFOA exemption to require only
reasonableness, however, would define an RFOA exemption so
broad as to swallow any distinct BFOQ exemption. Therefore
the structure of section 623 implies that both the BFOQ and the
RFOA must be "necessary to the normal operations of the par-
ticular business."
Furthermore, Congress could hardly have intended the
RFOA to preempt a subsequent, judicially developed exemp-
tion. Rather, as noted above,144 Congress sought to provide ti-
tle VII protection for older Americans while allowing for
differences peculiar to them. The congressional debates reveal
some concern that the ADEA might force employers to hire or
keep physically or otherwise unqualified workers, and the
RFOA provision was an assurance that such was not the case.
It thus deals with a necessary business policy which is neutral
on its face but adversely affects older workers.145
Finally, to replace "business necessity" with a reasonable-
ness standard would completely subvert the ADEA. As its ad-
vocate noted, the reasonableness standard would not allow a
plaintiff to demonstrate a lesser discriminatory alternative in
order to rebut the defendant's proof of reasonableness; the al-
ternative would be relevant only in determining whether the
policy was reasonable. 48 Under that rule, any showing of cost
savings for a business could be found "reasonable" and hence a
defense to an adverse impact on older workers. But this con-
travenes both the EEOC and the Wage and Hour Division
guidelines stating that cost cannot be a RFOA.147 It also sub-
verts the clear congressional goal of preventing economic dis-
crimination against older workers. 4 8
The same contravention of congressional intent would oc-
cur if courts give business necessity or RFOA status to factors
that are so closely correlated with age that they act as prox-
ies. 14 9 Congress explicitly stated its desire to ameliorate the
economic hardships suffered by older Americans because of
age discrimination in employment. Congress was not trying
merely to prohibit cost saving adminstrative devices that af-
fected older workers but rather sought to prevent the use of
144. See supra notes 53-69 and accompanying text.
145. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,251-254 (1967).
146. See Player, supra note 140, at 1280.
147. See supra note 61.
148. See supra notes 53-69 and accompanying text.
149. Both experience and rank are often correlated with age. See supra
note 62.
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cost as an overall factor in employment decisions affecting
those between forty and seventy.150 To excuse cost standards
under the guise of an exemption would subvert congressional
intent and gut the statute.
One could argue that such a view is unfair because it ex-
tends an advantage to a group that has already had its chance
in the market place or because restricting cost-based decision-
making hinders business effectiveness. Nonetheless, such pol-
icy considerations cannot destroy Congress's conclusion that
the economic plight of older Americans is serious enough to
grant them special protection in the workforce.
CONCLUSION
The ADEA is a remedial statute passed by Congress to pro-
hibit employment discrimination based on age just as title VII
prohibited employment discrimination based on race, ethnicity,
religion, or gender. The virtually identical language of the
ADEA and title VII reflects the similarity of congressional goals
for the two statutes. Moreover, in analyzing employment dis-
crimination cases under a disparate treatment theory, the
courts have used title VII and ADEA precedents interchangea-
bly. The same should be true for cases based on a disparate
impact analysis. Congress has statutorily declared race, ethnic-
ity, religion, gender, and age to be protected classes. In title
VII cases, the courts have interpreted that protection to include
discriminatory effect as well as discriminatory intent. Since
nothing about the ADEA and its protected class distinguishes
it from title VII and its protected classes, disparate impact
analysis should also apply in ADEA cases.
Furthermore, the use of disparate impact analysis in ADEA
cases should not be subverted by blurring the theoretical bases
for using statistical evidence in disparate treatment and dispa-
rate impact theories. A prima facie case in disparate impact
analysis should be established when a plaintiff demonstrates a
disproportionate effect of a policy on the protected group. As
long as statistical analysis shows that the disparity did not oc-
cur by chance, courts should not require a minimum level of
disparity. Moreover, although the defendant can rebut such a
prima facie showing by demonstrating a business necessity for
the policy or proving that the impact actually resulted from a
factor other than age, the higher cost of employing older or
150. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,252 (1967).
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more experienced workers should not rebut a disparate impact.
To do so would negate one of the most important reasons for
the statute and completely contravene the statute's wording
and logical construction.
Marla Ziegler
